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Indonesia's Transmigration Programme

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The Politics of Transmigration

by
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During the Dutch colonial era, Java was the centre-piece of the Dutch East Indies empire, the base from which the surrounding islands were brought under Dutch suzerainty by force of arms. The Dutch, who first started Transmigration, publicised the programme as a means of giving impoverished Javanese peasants a new start in life. In reality, Transmigration served primarily to supply cheap labour to foreign-owned plantations in the newly subjugated territories. Today, all the talk about Transmigration's laudable social and economic objectives is equally misleading. The real rationale for the scheme is political. The project enjoys the active support of the military because it allows the Army to impose its doctrine of 'Territorial Management'. In effect, Transmigration is being used as a means of enforcing Jakarta's will throughout the Indonesian archipelago.

Transmigration has been the subject of numerous academic studies in Indonesia, many of them critical of the scheme.[1] Many press reports are equally alarming. However hard the government tries to win support for the programme, it is obvious to most observers that the economic justifications for the project are becoming threadbare. Yet despite all the criticism, the programme continues to swallow up huge financial resources while wreaking havoc on the environment, to say nothing of the fate inflicted on the millions of tribal people who are being swept into oblivion.

In all the public discourse about Transmigration, there is one officially-proclaimed objective that is never discussed; namely, "the strengthening of national defence and security".[2] The reason for this blindspot is not hard to find: The strategic designs of the regime are matters for military leaders alone to publicise and explain in as far as it is in their interest to do so. Yet it is this objective above all which explains why the programme is not likely to be abandoned, however damaging it may be. Transmigration is integral to the goal of nation-building, which involves not only the assimilation of all ethnic groups into a single Indonesian identity but the imposition of Java's hegemony over the entire archipelago.

Transmigration Under the Dutch

Indonesia is a highly centralised state composed of many thousands of islands, the largest of which are Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan (Borneo), Sulawesi and West Papua. Under Dutch rule, it was in Java that the necessary infrastructure for expanding Dutch commercial interests was located, the processing factories, plantations, railways, and export-import and insurance companies. It was in Java too that the Dutch allowed an educational system to grow and where the first tertiary educational institutions were established. Growth in the "outer" islands was limited to the establishment of rubber, coffee and tobacco plantations set up in various parts of Sumatra, and the oil installations in Sumatra and Kalimantan.

But the populations of these "territories beyond the seas"[3] were not prepared to abandon their traditional way of life for the rigours and meagre earnings of plantation life. Nor were they part of a well-structured feudal system such as existed in Java; hence, they could not be made to work. Thus Javanese peasants were dispatched under the colonisation programme launched nearly a century ago to work as contract coolie labour, becoming Indonesia's first generation of "Transmigrants". From the very start, Transmigration had the effect of drawing the archipelago into the orbit of the Dutch East Indies economy, while pacifying parts of the empire as yet beyond the reach of the Dutch colonial administration. Peasants from the centre were used as the unwitting victims of combined feudal and colonial exploitation to further this design.

Colonisation after Indonesian Independence

The creation of an independent Indonesian state after the Second World War did not redress the imbalance between Java and its periphery. The nationalist leaders who assumed state power after the proclamation of independence in 1945 were mostly Javanese or non-Javanese intellectuals who had been educated at Dutch schools in Java or in Holland. The framework of their nationalist political vision fitted comfortably into the Dutch framework of ruling a far-flung state based on Java, albeit from the opposite vantage point of expelling the Dutch and themselves taking control of the same territory. With hardly any exceptions, they insisted that all the territories which the Dutch had conquered by force of arms should become part of the new republic.[4]

This is not to say that the unitary and centralised republican state came into being without conflict.

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Both before and after the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, regional rebellions against the central government broke out in many parts of the archipelago, including Aceh in North Sumatra, South Sulawesi and the Moluccas, but the republican army based on Java succeeded in gaining the upper hand every time. Regionalism became a lost cause, resisted by civilian politicians and military leaders alike.

Colonisation was one of the first of the pre-war programmes to be resumed by the republican government which as early as 1949 announced a programme for the transmigration of 48 million people from Java over a 35-year period. The target of this grandiose scheme was later reduced to two million people every five years. Even this more modest scheme never had the remotest chance of being implemented—but this did not dampen President Sukarno's enthusiasm for Transmigration which he described as a "vehicle for nation-building through assimilation and ethnic integration".[5] The ideology of 'nation-building' and 'national unity' expounded by Indonesia's first president was taken up even more zealously by his successor, General Suharto who seized power in 1965. Under military rule, the colonisation of the "outer" territories took on a new urgency, *with the difference that Suharto has enjoyed the unstinting financial support of the western powers.*

Transmigration and the Spread of Military Rule

It may come as a surprise that a programme ostensibly designed for the attainment of economic and social objectives is also required to promote national defence. At the outset, it should be explained that "defence" policy in Indonesia has little to do with defending the state against foreign invaders. It is fundamentally a policy designed to ensure that the local population supports whatever national or local programmes the Army has decided to pursue "in the name of the people".

The Army is a territorial force whose command structure reaches down to the smallest social unit, the village *(desa)* in the countryside and the neighbourhood association *(rukun tetangga)* in the cities and towns. Its "defence" doctrine is compacted into one of those acronyms much favoured by the military, "*Sishankamrata*" which stands for "System of Defence and Security of the Entire People" *(Sistem Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta).* "Unpopulated" areas or areas populated by "nomads" or "culturally inferior" people simply do not lend themselves to such a defence system.

The Army defines the regional task of its vast network of territorial units as "territorial management" *(pembinaan teritorial).* This is inseparably linked with "area (i.e. territorial) management" *(pembinaan wilayah),*[6] which is the responsibility of the civil administration where many posts are also held by active or retired military officers.

Two documents setting out the Army's attitude to Transmigration and the resettlement of remote populations have come into TAPOL's hands, both written by (then) Brigadier-General Sembiring Meliala when he was commander of the Cendrawasih/XVII Regional Military Command in Irian Jaya (West Papua). The first, produced in January 1983, is entitled, *The Transmigration Programme in Irian Jaya must be handled in a special way in order to help resolve the security problem.*[7] The second, dated April 1984, is entitled *The Basic Pattern of Territorial Management specific to Irian Jaya, employing the method of Community Development Centres.*[8] They both spell out the fundamentals of the Army's policy of "territorial management" and make it clear why the Army attaches such importance to Transmigration.

"Territorial management," writes Brig-Gen Sembiring, must be "implemented by the entire state apparatus and the whole of society, with the Armed Forces as the core executor." The objective of "territorial management" is:

> "To manage the potentials of the area including the geographical and demographic factors and the ideological-political-social-cultural-military conditions, in order to create regional strength as the invincible arena, instrument, and condition of struggle for implementing the defence-security task by means of the security approach."[9]

Moreover, this system must be implemented "in its totality, throughout the length and breadth of the country."[10] Sembiring does not omit to point to its particular applicability to Irian Jaya, the Indonesian province that not only borders on Papua New Guinea,[11] but which also has the additional "troublesome factor" of a "separatist" movement.[12] To clinch his argument about the importance he attaches to the potential defence and security role played by Transmigrants, Sembiring quotes General Suharto who said in 1975,

> ". . . What we need is a system which enables (the Armed Forces) to discover speedily the place and nature of disturbances that arise. In this connection, the ability of the people to protect the security of their own surroundings and prepare these surroundings for purposes of effective defence must be the primary force in coping with such dangers."[13]

Regional development (and hence Transmigration) is required, according to this doctrine, primarily in order to beef up the regional and national "defence" objectives of the Army. "Before the government sets about constructing the physical infrastructure (of development), it must first prepare the population of Irian Jaya to be capable of utilising this physical infrastructure".[14] This process of preparation involves primarily the colonisation of the territory by Transmigrants from Java and the relocation of the native inhabitants into a network of "centres for community development".

The Army's Attitude to Indigenous Groups

Sembiring's document on Transmigration is laced with complaints about the "backwardness" of the Irianese. They are "simple-minded", "vastly different from their compatriots from Java", "backward in agriculture, craftsmanship and motivation for attaining a better life" and "not yet ready" for development. It is "extremely difficulty for the government apparatus to

fathom and assimilate *(menghayati)* their special customs and traditions".[15] Moreover, "consciousness about defending the state and about being members of a state are still lacking" while the "programme for people's defence training is not yet proceeding as it should". All this makes the "backward" Irianese "prone to incitement by the separatists".[16] Moreover, the commander of the Cendrawasih Divisional Command laments the fact that "the government apparatus is not dominant enough in the interior in comparison with traditional and tribal heads and missionaries".[17]

Sembiring who now holds a senior position in the Army general staff does not believe that the inhabitants of his former military fiefdom should be allowed to mingle with their "compatriots" from Java in the Transmigration sites because they are "so far behind". Rather, in contrast with official Transmigration guidelines, he advocates a two-pronged resettlement policy for West Papuans. In areas where local inhabitants have been robbed of their ancestral lands and are therefore "compensated" by becoming part of the APPDT* resettlement quota, they should not be allowed to live on the sites for newcomers but should be settled in sites of their own nearby or left in their own villages, which would then be treated as "local Transmigration sites".

In other parts of the territory where people live in remote and inaccessible homesteads (unlikely ever to become Transmigration sites), they should be relocated into community development centres where they will be more easily accessible to administrative control. Sembiring has elaborated a programme for the relocation of remote tribal people which could take anything from five to eight years to complete. After eighteen months devoted to selecting and preparing the relocation sites, the tribal people from the interior will be "invited" to participate in the programme (a process which could take three to six months), followed by six months "guidance and instruction" about their new agricultural pursuits, and another two to five years during which they will be given "instruction on living as communities, on how to educate their children, on religion, and so on".[18] Major-General Busiri Suryowinoto who was governor of Irian Jaya for two years from 1981 complained that the local people "have not yet reached the stage where they are capable of submitting to orders."[19] Sembiring's community development centres are evidently designed to change all that.

The relocation programme elaborated by Sembiring is not limited to West Papua. His document gives us an insight into the programme being implemented by the Department for Social Affairs in other parts of the archipelago among so-called "isolated and alien tribes" *(suku-suku terasing)* in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and North Sumatra.

By carpeting the entire province of West Papua and other "under-populated" regions with Javanese Transmigration sites, local Transmigration sites and

PHOTO: KOMPAS

General Murdani. Commander of the Armed Forces, leads a contingent of troops on an assignment to open up a Transmigration site in South Sulawesi.

community development centres, it will then be possible for the Army to practise "territorial management" down through the hierarchy of military command posts, the *kodims* (district military commands), *koramils* (sub-district military commands) and *babinsas* (village guidance NCOs) in charge of putting Sishankamrata into practice. Governable colonies of people will make "total people's defence" a reality and provide the justification for military presence everywhere.

Transmigration as a 'cordon sanitaire'

Colonisation of the border regions of Indonesia has an explicit strategic objective. Transmigration Minister Martono was surprisingly frank on the subject at a meeting of Transmigration officials in September 1985:

> "Preparations are under way for a programme of Transmigration sites based on the *Saptamarga* Model, for application in trouble-spots . . . such as Natuna Island in Riau, the islands off the west coast of Sumatra, East Timor and the border region of West Sumatra. The largest area for emplacement of sites of this model is Irian Jaya where 13 sub-districts will be affected."[20]

Moreover, he said, the settlement of Transmigrants in all sensitive or uninhabited regions bordering on foreign countries is to be given priority.

The *Saptamarga* model is named after the 'Seven Vows' which all members of the Armed Forces are required to take as their pledge of allegiance to the Armed Forces. A *Saptamarga* site is populated by active or retired members of the Armed Forces. In

• *Alokasi Pemukiman Penduduk Daerah Transmigrasi* or Resettlement Allocation for Inhabitants of a Transmigration Region.

some sites not formally designated as Saptamarga sites, members of the Armed Forces are assigned to mingle with the ordinary Transmigrants. While speaking about these plans, Minister Martono gave the impression that the link between such sites and defence and security operations was "still under discussion". In fact, Saptamarga Transmigration sites have been in existence in the northern section of the border with Papua New Guinea for some time, effectively guarding both an area where OPM activity is widespread (see Box, p 103) and a popular route for political dissidents wishing to flee the country. This is also the area where a "resettlement location" has been set up for West Papuans who fled the country in 1984 and who were subsequently repatriated. They are now being held under "special guidance".[21]

The "cordon sanitaire" motive is very much in the minds of officials in charge of Indonesia's resettlement policy. Take for example the programme to relocate 18,500 "alien and isolated tribal families" during the course of the present Five-Year Plan. The Secretary-General of the Department for Social Affairs linked this relocation programme to government intentions to "deploy the people as 'security belts' (original English) supporting social defence (sic) in Indonesia's border territories".[22]

The Strategic Importance of Site Location

General Benny Murdani, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces is quite frank about the importance which the country's military rulers attach to Transmigration. He describes it as "the only programme in the economic field that must quite categorically be tied in with defence and security considerations". The preparation of sites and the removal of obstacles to land availability need to be given special focus, he said, because "the choice of locations is related to the concept of territorial management in the regions". This is why the Armed Forces "must be involved at the earliest possible stage in selecting the sites".[23]

Soon after this statement, several key appointments were made in the central military and civilian bureaucracy. Meliala Sembiring, now a major-general, was appointed Inspector-General for Territorial People's Resistance at the Army General Staff, a newly created post where his theories on "public order" and social control can be given more general application. Then, Major-General C.I. Santosa, a close associate of Murdani's, and, like Sembiring, a former commander of Irian Jaya, was appointed Secretary-General of the Transmigration Department. Both men have also done military service in East Timor, giving them experience in the use of mass relocation schemes as a major counter-insurgency tactic.

In October 1985, President Suharto issued an instruction to the Army to become involved in the choice and preparation of Transmigration sites.[24] Suharto has long been known to have an obsessional interest in Transmigration. His personal interest in the project has for many years been such that no official has dared oppose it. The new instruction is clearly intended to give the Army a direct role in the project.

Despite the Indonesian Army waging brutal wars against tribal communities in East Timor and West Papua, Britain has become a major supplier of arms to Indonesia, including Hawk jets. The UK Government claims that these jets are used for "training purposes only". In early 1986, the Indonesian Armed Forces announced that two Hawk ground attack squadrons were operational.

The first major Transmigration site which the Army was involved in preparing was in a remote part of South Sulawesi. In a highly publicised ceremony, which took place in early 1986, General Murdani, accompanied by the Army chief of staff, his deputy, the regional military commander and many other leading military figures, marched at the head of a large contingent of troops to begin clearing 750 hectares of land. The troops have been assigned to build 500 housing units and to construct roads and bridges, working on the project for a whole year.[25] The military commander of Sulawesi, Major-General Nana Narundana, who was appointed in late 1985, is in charge of this operation. He was a classmate of Sembiring's at the National Military Academy and produced a document several years ago during his tour of duty in Aceh on "territorial management in support of regional development".[26] Narundana is widely acknowledged to have directed the Army's pacification efforts against a movement in Aceh proclaiming the right to Acehnese independence. The Santosa-Sembiring-Narundana appointments point to a move at the highest level of the Army to use experienced practitioners of "territorial management" to consolidate control over those who live in the "territories of the periphery".

Army decision-making on site location could also strengthen the position of the military where different

arms of the bureaucracy are in dispute over control of a piece of land. Land claimed for Transmigration is often disputed by the forestry department, for example, or there may be pressure to override advice from specialised agencies warning that the land is unsuitable for cultivation. From now on, it is likely that whatever the conflicting claims, the Army's word will prevail if it considers the site strategically important for territorial management or border security.

Transmigration in East Timor

The control of the local population is at the heart of the Indonesian Army's strategy in its war against the people of East Timor. This former Portuguese colony which borders on Indonesian West Timor was invaded by Indonesia in December 1975, nine days after Fretilin, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, proclaimed the country independent. Fretilin had been in command of the territory following the sudden departure of the Portuguese colonial administration in August 1975 during a brief civil war between Fretilin and the right-wing Union for a Democratic Timor (UDT). Despite their superiority in troops and equipment, the Indonesian forces were unable for two years to gain control of the mountainous interior where the vast majority of East Timorese had taken refuge. In 1977, by then equipped with OV-10 Broncos and A4-Skyhawks from the US, Indonesia launched a campaign of encirclement and annihilation, relying primarily on aerial bombardment. This caused huge casualties and forced the vast majority of people down into the coastal plains. Wracked by starvation and disease, an estimated 200,000 people—about one-third of the pre-invasion population—had lost their lives by the end of 1979. Although organised armed resistance was crushed during the two-year Indonesian offensive, Fretilin was able to remuster its forces and continues to wage mobile guerrilla warfare to this day.

By the end of 1979, several hundred thousand Timorese had been rounded up and forced into dozens of strategic encampments, called *pemukiman* or settlements by the Indonesians but depised by the Timorese as concentration camps. Security regulations are strict; inhabitants are prohibited from moving in and out without special permission, even to grow food, and land use is restricted to areas very close to camp boundaries. The population of East Timor was thus uprooted and relocated as the result of a protracted military campaign to destroy armed resistance. The East Timorese, like other people living on the periphery of the Indonesian state, are mostly shifting cultivators who used to live in isolated and remote mountain hamlets.

The violent dispossession of ancestral land rights in East Timor is the most extreme example of military intentions towards "isolated and alien tribes" throughout the archipelago. Many military strategists gained experience of the relocation of "backward" people during tours of duty in East Timor. The strategy and tactics of social control in East Timor were revealed in a collection of secret Indonesian Army manuals smuggled out of the country in 1983.[27] Notwithstanding repeated tactical changes, territorial management has failed to stifle resistance, not only in the mountainous interior where Fretilin guerrillas freely roam but also in the heavily-guarded camps.

With war still raging and territorial management being used as an instrument of war, there is less need for large-scale transmigration in East Timor. But transmigration on a more limited scale is being used to transform the more successfully pacified parts of the country into large-scale rice farms and cash-crop estates, while preventing the East Timorese from resuming their normal agricultural pursuits. The Indonesians are contemptuous of East Timor's "backward" farmers and claim that expanding rice production is the result of "the improved farming skills of the people", made possible by the influx of "model" farmers from Bali. Balinese farmers have been brought over as Transmigrants since 1982, and located in several new villages together with East Timorese "translocals" who have been uprooted from their own villages. Many of these "model" farmers turned out to be nothing of the sort. Recently, when journalists interviewed young Balinese Transmigrants, they were told that they were not farmers at all but high school graduates who thought they could get jobs as businessmen or civil servants in East Timor.[28]

Transmigration in East Timor is producing two quite distinct types of settlements. The Timorese in the resettlement camps live under tight military control and have been deliberately bypassed by Indonesian-style development. On the other hand, there are a few settlements known as "villages of potential" *(desa potensial)* being set up with irrigated rice fields and plantations. Two examples are Tunubibi in Bobonaro district and Beco in Kovalima district both of which are frequently spotlighted in the Indonesian press. Founded in 1982, Tunubibi has a population of 50 Balinese families and 50 "translocals". Thanks to sizeable government investment, Tunubibi uses solar energy for its electricity and fresh-water supplies, and has equipment for producing bio-gas and other hi-tech facilities.

These *desa potensial* are part of a larger strategy aimed at destroying the traditional village-based cultures of the Timorese. Instead, the villagers are to be incorporated into the market economy whilst East Timor itself is to be transformed into one vast plantation, producing cash-crops. Ir Hadiono, a Javanese who heads the East Timor office of the Department of Agriculture, recently told foreign journalists that East Timor's 14,600 square kilometres will be transformed into a neatly arranged "cottage garden", with 15 per cent of the land given over to producing vegetables, 9 per cent set aside for pasturing, 10 per cent for tree-crop plantations, 24 per cent for commercial forests, 10 per cent for irrigated-rice production and the remainder for non-agricultural uses.[29] This will enable Jakarta to control a potentially huge agricultural surplus, while leaving the vast majority of Timorese to wither away in resettlement camps with little land to cultivate and subjected to gross restrictions on their freedom of movement.

Military Revitalisation of a Flagging Project

The Army's well publicised intrusion into the Transmigration programme in 1985 came at a time when officials who have been running the programme for years were expressing alarm at the failure of so many sites (see pp 72).

Transmigration Minister Martono is now giving the impression that his department will no longer pursue quantitative targets but concentrate instead on upgrading conditions at existing sites. He is even reported as saying that his department will not go ahead with the establishment of new sites.[30] When surveying the results of the Third Five-Year Plan which ended in April 1984, the Minister confessed that 67 out of the 800 sites established since 1969 were in need of major reconstruction.[31] Eighteen months later he admitted that 16 sites had to be closed down because "they were not fit for human habitation".[32] Not long afterwards, the Department's Secretary-General, C.I. Santosa, listed a host of reasons why sites intended for peasant agriculture are no longer proving viable, and admitted that the Department is now having to rethink many aspects of the programme.

In the midst of misgiving and crisis, the Armed Forces have given the programme a powerful boost by demonstrating their unreserved support. If Martono talks about halting the establishment of new sites within days of Murdani's demonstrative participation in new site clearance, does it mean that new site preparation is to become largely the responsibility of the Armed Forces, not the Transmigration Department? Whatever the answer to this crucial question, the security component of the programme is now becoming more prominent as compared with its social and economic objectives.

And where does this leave the World Bank whose officials have spewed out so many millions of words to justify Transmigration, claiming that they need to be in there, making sure the programme performs well? We do at least know from the substantial redrafting of key Bank documents that takes place to accommodate Indonesian Government sensitivities (see "Banking on Disaster" in this issue), that some Bank officials have serious reservations about present and future objectives. The Bank itself admits that, even after the completion of three Five-Year Plans and well into the Fourth, "an overall assessment of the Transmigration programme is not feasible" because "detailed evaluations" that have apparently been undertaken by the Indonesian authorities are not available.[33] This gives the impression of a juggernaut hurtling towards some unknown destination with no-one pausing to consider the consequences.

The World Bank should be challenged to explain its attitude towards the strategic implications of Transmigration. It is hardly likely to be a coincidence that at a time when the Armed Forces have begun to be directly involved in site-location decisions, the World Bank's fifth loan to the programme—the biggest to date—should be concentrated almost entirely on aerial mapping and the location of new sites. To ignore the role being played by the Army in the implementation of the programme is simply naive. The politics of Transmigration are firmly based in the pursuit of military power. They must be incorporated into any serious analysis of the programme.

Notes and References

1. See *Laporan Kunjungan Team Studi Transmigrasi Irian Jaya 13-18 January 1985 (Report of the Transmigration Study Team to Irian Jaya 13-18 January 1985),* the Research Institute for Village and Regional Development, Gadjah Mada University, Jogjakarta (mimeographed).

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   Mustopadidjaya Ar, *Population Redistribution Policy in Indonesia: Its Evolution, Performances and Alternative Perspectives for the Future,* Doctoral Dissertation, Faculty of Development Studies, University of Pittsburg, 1984.

   Transmigrasi, Dari Daerah Asal sampai Benturan Budaya di Tempat Pemukiman (Transmigration, from Region of Origin to Culture Clash in the Place of Settlement), Satya Wacana Christian University, Salatiga, 1984.
2. Article 2, Law No 33, 1972 on the Basic Provisions of Transmigration.
3. The terminology for all the islands excluding Java has invariably been Java-centrist: "Outer Islands" and "territories beyond the seas", for example. Recently, "Outer Islands" is occasionally replaced by "Other Islands", possibly because it has a less exclusivist ring.
4. Mohammad Hatta, the first Vice-President of the Republic, was critical of the decision to include West Papua within republican territory when the new republic was under discussion at a meeting of the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence, which was held under the auspices of the Japanese occupation authorities in mid 1945. This appears to be the only time he voiced such criticism.
5. Sukarno, *Transmigration is a Matter of Life and Death for Nation Building,* Department of Information, Jakarta, 1964.
6. "Territorial" has the same meaning as "wilayah". It is just an add-on English word used in military circles to provide an extra term for the same thing.
7. Hereinafter referred to as the 'TM Paper'.
8. Hereinafter referred to as the 'CDC Paper'.
9. *CDC Paper, op. cit.* (*supra* note 8) p 5.
10. *ibid:* 5.
11. *ibid:* 11.
12. *ibid:* 15.
13. *ibid:* 7.
14. *ibid:* 21.
15. *TM Paper, op. cit.* (*supra* note 7), p 5.
16. *ibid:* 6-7.
17. *ibid:* 5.
18. *CDC Paper, op. cit.* (*supra* note 8), p 38, and Appendix A. The diagram in Appendix A is reproduced in *TAPOL Bulletin,* No. 65, September 1984, p 10.
19. *Tempo,* 10 May 1981.
20. *Kompas,* 6 September 1985.
21. Hilman Najib, "Proyek Transmigrasi di Irian Jaya", (The Transmigration Project in Irian Jaya" in *Report of the Visit of the Transmigration Study Team to Irian Jaya* (mimeographed), Gadjah Mada University, Jogjakarta, 1985, p 88.
22. *Jakarta Post,* 21 September 1985.
23. *Sinar Harapan,* 8 March 1985.
24. *Kompas,* 6 January 1986.
25. *ibid.*
26. *CDC Paper, op. cit.* (*supra,* note 8), p 45.
27. The manuals are reproduced in full in Budiardjo and Liem, *The War Against East Timor,* Zed Books, London, 1984.
28. *Indonesia Reports,* September 1985, quoting *Sinar Harapan,* 28 August 1985.
29. *TAPOL Bulletin,* No. 72, November 1985.
30. *Kompas,* 27 January 1986.
31. *Jakarta Post,* May 1984.
32. *Jakarta Post,* 16 December 1985.
33. *Kedaulatan Rakyat,* 17 January 1986.